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Abstract 
 
Polygynous marriage is generally more beneficial for men than it is for women, though 
women may choose to marry an already married man if he is the best alternative 
available. We use the theory of biological markets to predict that the likelihood of a man 
marrying polygynously will be a function of the level of resources that he has, the local 
sex ratio, and also the resources that other men in the local population have. Using 
records of over one million men in 56 districts from the 2002 Ugandan census, we show 
that polygynously-married men are more likely to own land than monogamously-married 
men, that polygynous marriages become more common as the district sex ratio becomes 
more female-biased, that owning land is particularly important when males are abundant 
in the district, and that a man’s owning land most increases the odds of polygyny in 
districts where few other men own land. Results are discussed with reference to models 
of the evolution of polygyny. 
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\body 
Introduction 
 
Most human societies historically have allowed polygyny, or the marriage of more than 
one woman to one man (1-2). However, within polygynous societies, many marriages are 
monogamous, and across polygynous societies, there is variation both in the mean and in 
the variance of the number of wives per married man. What, then, explains how many 
wives men marry? 
 
The payoffs to polygyny are not symmetric across the two sexes. Men always increase 
their reproductive success by adding an extra wife. In African agriculturalist and 
pastoralist societies, for example, every extra wife a man has adds to his number of 
surviving offspring, and most of the variance in men’s reproductive success is explained 
by variation in number of wives (3-6). For women, being polygynously married appears 
less beneficial, since each additional wife sub-divides household resources and male 
investment. Compared to monogamously married women, polygynously married women 
have lower fertility (7-9), increased child mortality (10), and poorer child growth and 
development (11-12). The latter two outcomes obviously affect the reproductive success 
of both parents, but fall disproportionately on women, for whom they are not offset by 
the increased offspring number that men experience in polygynous marriages. The costs 
of polygyny appear to fall particularly on women of later rank in the union, and their 
children (6, 13). Thus, it seems that polygynous marriage in African societies is most 
beneficial to men, and most costly to women, especially wives of lower rank.  
 
Situations where individuals receive asymmetric payoffs from collaboration, and yet 
continue to collaborate, can be conceptualised using the theory of biological markets (14-
17). Biological markets operate wherever there are two classes of individual (e.g. male 
and female), with distinct commodities to exchange (e.g. resources and fertility), and 
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where each has the possibility of partner choice. This leads to competition within each 
class to attract members of the other class. The central prediction of biological market 
theory is that the ‘exchange rate’ between the two commodities will vary as a function of 
supply and demand. That is, where females are very common and males scarce, males 
will have greater market power, and achieve outcomes more favourable to their interests, 
whereas where females are scarce and males common, females will be able to drive a 
harder bargain and achieve outcomes more favourable to theirs (14, 18-20).  
 
Market reasoning leads to the simple prediction that the frequency of polygynous 
marriages will increase as the local operational sex ratio (OSR) decreases (that is, 
becomes more female-biased; 10). However, it is not just the number of men available 
which is important, but also the resources that they offer. Resources, in terms of land or 
livestock, are sought-after in a potential husband, and have a positive impact on 
women’s lifetime reproductive success (21). Women may do better becoming the second 
wife of a man with abundant resources than the first wife of a man with few, leading to a 
threshold of inequality between men above which polygynous unions will begin to be 
seen (21, 22). Thus, we can predict that having more resources will increase a man’s 
chances of marrying polygynously, and also that the effect of having resources will vary 
according to the characteristics of the local market. Where the OSR is high (i.e. male-
biased), then competition between men is intensified, and it should become even more 
important to have resources. The resources of a man’s local competitors will also 
moderate the effect of his own resources. That is, where many men in the local market 
have a given level of resources, that level of resources will be less effective at attracting 
more than one wife than in a market where few rivals can offer it.  
 
Thus study examines market effects on polygynous marriage in contemporary Uganda. 
Uganda is a poor equatorial country (2007 GDP per capita estimated at $900), with most 
of the population rural (around 85%), and most people dependent on subsistence 
agricultural activity (estimated 80%; 23). The population (25 million in 2002) is divided 
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amongst around 45 ethnic groups speaking Niger-Congo and Nilo-Saharan languages. 
Our data source is a 10% representative sample of households from the Uganda 
Population and Housing Census of 2002. The sample contains family-composition and 
socio-economic data for around 1,107,000 men aged 15 or over. The sample has 
limitations in terms of grain of responses – for example, our resources variable is simply 
owning land versus not owning it – but more than compensates for this by its unusually 
large size and national representativeness.  
 
To examine market effects, we include compositional characteristics of the district in 
which the man lived, which we take to indicate the conditions of the local marriage 
market. Uganda was at this time divided into 56 districts. We calculated the OSR of each 
district, and the proportion of men within it who owned land, and entered these 
characteristics of the local market into a multi-level model alongside the individual-level 
characteristics of the man such as whether he owned land.  
 
Our predictions, based on biological markets theory, were that, controlling for potential 
confounding variables such as age, education and urbanisation: 
1. Owning land will increase a man’s probability of being in a polygynous marriage. 
2. Being in a district with a higher (i.e. more male-biased) OSR will decrease a man’s 
probability of being in a polygynous marriage.  
3. There will be an interaction between the district OSR and individual land 
ownership, such that owning land becomes increasingly important for the 
attainment of polygynous marriage the higher (i.e. more male biased) the local 
sex ratio. 
4. There will be an interaction between a man’s land ownership and the proportion of 
other men in the district who also own land, such that land ownership has a 
greater effect on the probability of polygynous marriage in districts where few 
people have land.  
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Results 
Please insert Table 1 here 
Please insert Table 2 here 
 
 
The results for the model are shown in Table 2. There are significant main effects of 
several control variables, such as age, education and urbanisation. Here, we concentrate 
on the predicted effects. Prediction 1 was for a main effect of individual land ownership. 
This prediction is confirmed. All else being equal, the odds of polygyny become 2.28 
times larger if a male owns land compared to when he does not. Prediction 2 was for 
decreasing OSR at the district level to increase the probability of polygyny. Again, the 
prediction is met. The odds ratio of 33.28 means that if the district OSR changes from 
0.5 to 0.4, the odds of polygyny increase by a factor of 3.3, all else being equal.   
 
Prediction 3 was for an interaction between OSR and land ownership. This interaction is 
indeed significant (Table 2). Figure 1 allows this interaction to be visualised by showing 
the predicted proportion of men married polygynously according to the district OSR and 
whether they own land. As the figure shows, in a district with more females than average, 
a relatively high proportion of men are expected to marry polygynously, and it makes 
little difference whether they have land or not (in fact, those without land are predicted 
to be polygynous slightly more often). As the sex ratio increases, though, the proportion 
of polygynous men declines more steeply for landless than land owning men, so that in a 
relatively male-biased district, landowners are substantially more likely to have multiple 
wives than the landless are.  
 
Please insert figure 1 here 
Please insert figure 2 here 
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Finally, prediction 4 was for an interaction between the proportion of men owning land in 
the district, and individual land ownership. Again, the prediction is met (Table 2). Figure 
2 shows that having land in a district where only a few men do dramatically increases 
one’s odds of a polygynous marriage, whereas having land in a district where many other 
men do has a much smaller effect.  This interaction effect is significantly stronger than 
the OSR* land ownership interaction (after standardization: Bland ownership*proportion ownership = 
0.038 (s.e.= 0.0097);  Bland ownership*OSR = 0.015 (s.e.=0.0062); Z= 1.997; p<0.05). 
 
Discussion 
 
Consideration of market forces, and the differing interests of men and women, led us to 
predict that the occurrence of polygynous marriage in Uganda would vary with men’s 
land ownership, with the land ownership of his rivals, and with the local sex ratio. These 
predictions were borne out in a large sample of households within districts. Having land 
more than doubled men’s chances of having more than one wife. As the district 
operational sex ratio became more male-biased, fewer men were able to marry 
polygynously. Such shifts affected all men, but the brunt fell on the landless particularly 
hard. Having land was particularly influential in districts where few other men had land, 
implying that what matters is not just the number of competitors but also their resources. 
This is suggestive of a polygyny threshold process, with women moving to become 
second wives where the resource offer of some men is much better than that of others. 
Overall, the predictions from the theory of biological markets were well supported within 
this large dataset, illustrating the utility of conceptualizing marriage in humans, as well 
as other forms of collaboration between unrelated individuals, as trading situations (15-
17, 20).  
 
There are some limitations to the current data set. First, we only measured whether the 
men owned land or not, whereas a continuous measure of quantity of land would allow 
more detailed and exact tests of polygyny threshold models. Second, we used the district 
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level as our local market. Districts in Uganda consist of hundreds of thousands of people, 
and it may that greater variance in polygyny could be explained by measuring OSR at a 
more local level (e.g. the village). However, this was not possible in the current analysis, 
and the significance of the results suggests that district-level data provide at least some 
indication of the market competition men and women face. Finally, we were unable in 
this study to track the consequences for men and women’s reproductive success of 
entering polygynous versus monogamous unions. This has been by some other studies 
(e.g. 6), but it would be desirable to do it in this Ugandan population, to follow through 
the biological market logic, which is that the sex with lower local bargaining power has to 
accept outcomes less conducive to their reproductive success than the sex with higher 
bargaining power. However, in the absence of longitudinal data, this is unlikely to be 
possible using this census.  
 
There has been considerable debate in the literature on polygyny in humans and in other 
species about whether it is best viewed as the result of female choice or of male coercion 
(24-25). The theory of biological markets is based on the assumption that traders of both 
types are able to choose their partners, and thus the predictions derived here assume 
mutual choice (or, at least, that a woman’s parents choose on her behalf). We cannot of 
course exclude that some coercion occurs, though it is not obvious that a coercion-based 
model would predict the patterns observed here. We note however that elements of the 
coercion view  - for example, that polygyny tends to benefit men more than women, and 
that women avoid it if they have good alternatives – are shared by the current market 
model. The difference is that we view levels of polygyny as being driven up not by the 
direct coercive power of men, but rather from the subtler market power that stems from 
men, and high quality men in particular, being scarce relative to the number of women 
available. Where women are the scarce resource, they gain market power and can drive 
the level of polygyny down, and/or the level of resources demanded up.  
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Methods 
 
The Ugandan Bureau of Statistics’ Uganda Population and Housing Census was conducted by face-
to-face interview during 7 days of fieldwork in September 2002, and aimed to reach all individuals 
present in the country. The 10% sample of households is made available by IPUMS-I (Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series International; 26), and is designed to faithfully represent the complete 
census population. We selected all men aged 15 or over for whom data were complete from each of 
the 529,271 households in the 10% sample (n=1,106,737). For each man, we coded whether he 
was in a polygynous marriage or not. We did not further discriminate number of wives due to 
declining numbers of cases. We also coded whether men owned land or not, their age, whether 
their residence was urban or rural, and their completed years of schooling. We used the same data 
set to estimate the following characteristics of the district within which the men live: the mean age, 
the proportion urbanised, the proportion of men who own land, and the OSR. Although the OSR is 
strictly the ratio of individuals of each sex available for marriage, in a polygynous society all adult 
men are potentially available for marriage, and so we simply used the number of individuals of 
each sex aged 15 and 50 present in the district (as in often done in studies of OSR in humans; 20, 
27). We calculate OSR as the number of males divided by the total number of people. A balanced 
sex ratio is thus 0.5 and higher ratios are more male-biased. The descriptive statistics for all the 
variables used are given in Table 1.  
 
As our dependent variable (polygyny) is dichotomous, and our predictors are a combination of 
categorical and continuous variables, we used negative binomial logistic regression (NBR; 28). All 
variables listed in table 1 were entered into the model as main effects, and we also test for two 
predicted interaction effects: land ownership*OSR (prediction 3) and  land ownership * proportion 
of landowners (prediction 4). The resulting model had absolute parameter, loglikelihood and 
Hessian convergence. 
 
In case the effects found were due to one outlying district, we reran the analysis excluding 
respectively the most male-biased state, the most female-biased state, the state with the highest 
proportion of landowners and the state with the lowest proportion of landowners. In no case were 
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the parameter estimates of these analyses significantly different to those presented below (data 
not shown). 
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Figure legends 
Figure 1: Operational sex ratio and predicted polygyny by land ownership. 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of landowners at district level and predicted polygyny by ownership. 
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Table legends 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the variables in the model (means and standard 
deviations for continuous variables, frequencies for categorical ones).  
 
Table 2: Estimates of the parameter estimates in the negative binomial regression for 
polygyny. Exp(B) are the odds ratios. The Wald statistic allows evaluation of the 
significance of individual parameter estimates. Note that the parameter and odds ratio 
for OSR are for OSR decreasing from 1 to 0, rather than increasing from 0 to 1, for ease 
of interpretation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 Continuous variables 
  
  Mean Std. Deviation 
District-
level 
  
  
  
Operational Sex Ratio (OSR)  0.49 0.01 
Urbanisation  0.58 0.12 
Mean age  32.88 1.64 
Proportion of landowners 
  
0.70 0.24 
Individual-
level 
  
Age  27.71 9.57 
Years of schooling 
  
5.33 4.01 
Categorical variables 
  
  Frequency   
Individual-
level 
  
  
  
Polygyny Polygynously 
married 
110100 
  
  
  
  
 Not 
polygynously 
married 
996637 
Urban-rural status Urban 168850 
Rural 937887 
Landownership 
  
Landowners 760384 
Non-
landowners 
346353 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the variables in the model (means and standard deviations 
for continuous variables, frequencies for categorical ones).  
 
 Parameter B Std. Error Wald p Exp(B) 
(Intercept)   -4.2634 0.2594 270.1272 <0.0001 0.0141 
Urban household rural -->urban -0.2591 0.0144 324.2463 <0.0001 0.7717 
Mean age district (year) -0.0377 0.0027 194.8048 <0.0001 0.9630 
Proportion of land owners (0 -->1) 0.7414 0.0333 495.4211 <0.0001 2.0989 
Landowner no --> yes 0.8276 0.2849 8.4364 0.0037 2.2878 
Operational sex ratio (OSR) (1 --> 0) 3.5050 0.5057 48.0321 <0.0001 33.2822 
Urbanisation (% Urban) (0 --> 1) -0.2961 0.0326 82.6585 <0.0001 0.7437 
Age (year) 0.0601 0.0003 34145.1404 <0.0001 1.0620 
Years of schooling (year) -0.0388 0.0009 1953.9085 <0.0001 0.9619 
Ownership* prop. landowners   -0.1576 0.0402 15.3918 <0.0001 0.8542 
Ownership* OSR   -1.3938 0.5826 5.7240 0.0167 0.2481 
 
Table 2: Estimates of the parameter estimates in the negative binomial regression for 
polygyny. Exp(B) are the odds ratios. The Wald statistic allows evaluation of the significance 
of individual parameter estimates. Note that the parameter and odds ratio for OSR are for 
OSR decreasing from 1 to 0, rather than increasing from 0 to 1, for ease of interpretation.  
 
